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Water and electricity networks between stress and reform: 
from post­civil war reconstruction to the new Lebanese wars 
Eric Verdeil 
Paper for the Conference The Politics and Planning of Destruction and Reconstruction in 
Lebanon, Oxford / 13-14 June 2008   
 
After the 2006 summer war and the 2007 assault of Nahr el Bared, the issue of energy and 
water supply is once again one of the main issues the Lebanese have to cope with. It is a 
consequence of the damages inflected by both conflicts (mostly during the 2006 war) as well 
as a result of the State paralysis, which is hindering the necessary reforms. But, to be honest, 
the recovery of the energy and water delivery, deeply affected by the civil war (1975-1990), 
has never been fully achieved during the reconstruction process. Strangely, while the crisis of 
these infrastructures has been recognized as one of the dimensions of the civil war urban crisis 
(Awada 1988, Davie 1991), urban scholarship has mostly overlooked the public service 
supply issue during the 1990’s.  
In this paper we would like to address it and, specifically, to understand how the water and 
electricity supply is linked to the process of territorial fragmentation in post civil war 
Lebanon. Since the end 1990’s, several attempts at reforming both sectors have been 
launched. They seem to be part of a wider global trend of neoliberal reforms affecting urban 
utilities. Since the social and territorial impacts of such reforms are usually strong, we will 
also try to assess their effects in the Lebanese cities. Lastly, we have to examine how the 
recent cycle of violence and of political unrest has heightened the problems, which is one of 
the currently most disputed political issues. 
The networked infrastructure’s crisis and 
territorial fragmentation: a framework for 
analysis 
While few academic works have dealt with that issue in Lebanon, networked infrastructure 
has been an important theme in the last 15 years for urban research, particularly regarding the 
so called developing countries. It has been shown that “Urban networks in the contemporary 
city are largely hidden, opaque, invisible” and that “the hidden flows and their technological 
framing render occult the social relations and power mechanisms that are scripted in and 
enacted through these flows” (Kaika, Swyngedouw 2000). In this respect, by focusing on such 
utilities in Lebanon, we expect to bring to light how the inequality of supply between regions 
and social groups is not the result of technical hazards but a revelator of socio-economical 
discrepancies, and the product of political regulations regarding the provision of water and 
electricity. 
The current reforms of utilities management can be regarded as part of a global trend of the 
implementation of neo-liberal policies. The book Splinterring urbanism: Networked 
Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities, and the Urban Condition (Graham, Marvin 2001) 
has been a landmark in literature and its main assumption has led to many works. It maintains 
that ‘a parallel set of processes are under way within which infrastructure networks are being 
‘unbundled’ in ways that help sustain the fragmentation of the social and material fabric of 
cities” (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 33). It is therefore interesting to understand to what 
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extent the reforms of the Lebanese water and electricity sectors look like the neoliberal 
transformations analysed by these authors and then, how do they nurture the social and spatial 
fragmentation process. 
Some scholars have questioned the relevance of Graham and Marvin’s main assumptions for 
developing countries. They have noted that, contrarily to industrial countries, one could 
hardly find in the history of most developing countries any signs of an integrated management 
of the basic infrastructure (that would then be unbundled). And they also state that it would be 
erroneous to depict the cities of developing countries as splintering while they had always 
been splintered (Coutard, 2008). The Lebanese history does not differ in that respect. Yet, the 
development policies of Fouad Chehab, President of the Republic (1958-1964) sought to 
achieve the universalization of basic infrastructure and much progress had been accomplished 
in the following years. But the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) has broken that effort and 
reversed the trends on the ground. Infrastructure provision has been used as a political weapon 
in the hands of the militias that controlled the fragmented country. The deliquescence of the 
management has led to the development of informal and substandard provision means, like 
electrical generators, private wells or private water supply (Awada,1988; Davie 1991). During 
the reconstruction years, though massive investments in electricity and water infrastructures, 
the effort has been spatially unequal. Many Lebanese cities (and even more, the countryside) 
have not benefited of such investments. Rather than resulting in a national upgrading, the 
rehabilitation policies (new infrastructural work) and the management of networks policies 
(tariff, fees collections, theft repression) have added new layers of differentiation between 
regions and cities (Verdeil, Féré, Scherrer, 2009). The fragmentation of basic services supply 
then is a long term process.  
Because of the limited room allowed to that paper, its purpose is not to analyse in detail the 
policies of the reconstruction years, and particularly does not explain the technical, financial 
and managerial reasons of the shortages in electricity and water. It firstly provides a few 
indicators revealing the spatial discrepancies related to water and electricity and, then, moves 
to a presentation of the recently implemented reforms, in order to understand their social and 
spatial impact.  
The article draws on fieldwork conducted in Lebanon during the years 2005-2007 where a 
range of stakeholders have been interviewed. We also gathered various statistics from the 
ministry of Energy and Water, the utilities and the available statistical compendium. The data 
were complemented by a press review from The Daily Star, L’Orient Le Jour, Le Commerce 
du Levant, more sporadically from the Arabic press and from various information web sites. 
Urban services and urban fragmentation in 
Lebanon 
The situation at the beginning of the 2000’s 
The uneven supply of urban services is a major dimension of urban fragmentation in the 
Lebanese cities, and notably in the main ones. It is a reality which is under-researched, 
especially if one compares it with the relative abundance of analysis of confessional 
segregation in the cities, or segregation processes linked to the implementation of urban 
projects and planning like for instance the development of shopping malls or megaprojects 
like Solidere. The overlooking of this question in Lebanon doesn’t reflect the importance of 
this topic in the urban studies in other areas of the developing world.  
The difficult access to urban services and the struggle for alternative supply sources is a daily 
experience shared by all the Lebanese since the war. This is may be overshadowing the 
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inequalities among the Lebanese people. Still, important differences between the cities and 
neighbourhoods in the supply of State produced services (like fresh water and electricity) are 
to be found. Alternative access to these services is possible - often informal - but, again, at the 
price of geographical and, most notably, economical discrepancies between places and 
individuals.  
The power sector provides a first example of such differences on three aspects: the 
administrative organisation, the quality of the supplying, and the cost for the customers.  
Different entitlements to urban services 
The first point to be mentioned is the legal status of households regarding access to electricity. 
The development of illegal settlements in Beirut and in other major cities during the civil war 
resulted in an administrative impossibility to connect those houses to the electricity network, 
since the administration had not granted the illegal dwellers the legal paper requested by law 
in order to be connected. But, over the time, refugees and some of the residents of illegal 
settlements have been granted a temporary access to the network, through a circuit-breaker 
that allows a 10 A delivery (izn isthlak) at a fixed price. Officially, such a connection was 
granted only to refugees whose status was certified by the moukhtar. But fieldwork surveys 
suggest that the maqtu’iya as it is called is far more widespread and that Electricité du Liban 
(EDL) has allowed more people to get connected in order to collect more bills (Khayat, 2008). 
Data provided at EDL for the year 2006 shows that about 4000 households and 3100 shops 
and workplaces in Dahiyeh, Beirut”s southern suburb) were granted such connection. The 
figure seems to be on the rise1. As it does not match the number of illegal houses in the 
suburbs, it probably means part of the households there are not connected to the grid and 
therefore get their electricity supply fraudulently2. Interestingly, according to official statistics 
published by the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS), 100% of the households in the 
country are connected to the grid, which overstates the reality of electricity delivery in 
popular and contested settlements.  
Table 1: Customers with circuit breaker (permission to consume, izn istihlak) (June 2006) 
EDL District Residential Non residential Total 
Antelias3  139 1458 1597 
Chiyah4  3952 3109 7061 
Lebanon   About 9000 
Source: interview, EDL, June 2006. 
The provision of the inhabitants of Palestinian camps is another case – and might differ from 
one camp to another. Because of the refugee status, the supply of the Palestinians living in 
camps can only be granted on a temporary basis, and under the auspices of UNRWA, the UN 
agency in charge of the camps. In the camp of Shatila, south of Beirut, electricity is supplied 
to the inhabitants through a similar system of izn istihlak (with circuit breaker of 5 or 10 A for 
a monthly lump sum). But the first subscription, in 1993, had been subsidised at 90% by 
UNRWA who managed the negociation with EDL. The Popular committee of the camp is the 
effective responsible of the fees’ collection and the technical management inside the camp. 
During the end of the 1990’s and the beginning of the 2000’s, EDL complained that UNRWA 
was indebted, and punished several times the inhabitants collectively and not on an individual 
basis, as was the case in other places where households supplied with a circuit-breaker. 
Though the access to electricity was made possible through a similar technical device, the 
                                                 
1 Interview with an engineer, EDL, Beirut, June 2006. 
2 In the Elyssar area only, the number of illegal households was estimated in 1991 to about 13000 (Clerc-
Huybrechts, 2002). 
3 EDL name for the district including the eastern and northern part of Beirut’s suburbs. 
4 EDL name for the district including the southern part of Beirut’s suburbs. 
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management thus was managed according to a specific rule and by specific actors5. An 
important number of inhabitants have no circuit breakers and have made hook-ups on the 
poles. 
The legal entitlement to electricity in the Lebanese cities is linked to the legal status of the 
residence. The dwellers of illegal settlements have no entitlement to electricity (and water) 
from the public network. Exceptions and temporary supply are granted for displaced persons. 
The Palestinian refugees in camps have another entitlement, through the UNRWA, with the 
same technical system. An unknown number of inhabitants thus cannot legally receive supply 
of electricity (which does not mean that all people making hook-ups are in that situation). 
Geographical and socio-economical contrasts in the access to electricity  
Though considerably improved from a 6 hours per day supply after the civil war, the effective 
delivery of electricity in Lebanon never went longer than 22 hours a day at its best in the end 
of 2004. This came along with noticeable differences between the capital city, Beirut, with an 
almost full time service, and various places in the country, sometimes less then 20 h a day. 
Considering their closeness, the difference between the capital city and its suburbs has a 
strong symbolical significance, highlighting their contrasting quality of life.  
 
Table 2: Duration of power delivery in hours in the Lebanese districts 
Reference 
period 
Beirut Antelias Chiyah Mount 
Lebanon 
(except 
Beirut 
and 
suburbs) 
South 
Lebanon 
except 
Marjayoun 
South Biqaa, 
Zahleh, 
Anjar, 
Marjayoun 
North Biqaa 
and 
Zahleh’s 
suburbs 
Tripoli 
Chekka 
Ehden 
Bcharri, 
Koura and 
part of 
Zgharta 
Akkar 
Denniyeh 
Minieh 
part of 
Zghorta, 
Batrun 
Mean 
supply in 
2004 23,83 21,71 21,32 21,09 19,74 20,43 20,3 22 20,38 
Supply in 
January 
2008 
21,25 16,25 14,75 15 15,75 15 15,25 16,75 16,5 
Source: EDL (2005); EDL quoted by L’Orient-Le Jour (2008) 
 
The shortage also has financial consequences for the inhabitants. According to a 2004 survey, 
38% of the households are using private generators at the household, the building, or the 
neighbourhood level. Regional differences are to be observed. We lack recent detailed data 
but in 1996, the ACS data showed that inner-city Beirut was much more equipped with 
building-generator than the suburbs, although the delivery was already better in the capital. It 
suggests that the use of a generator is related to the socio-economical status of the households. 
Indeed, another 2004 survey shows that the electricity cost is heavier for deprived households 
than for healthier ones (table 3).  
Table 3 
 Deprived households (less 
than 250 $ per month) 
Rich households (more than 
2000 $ per month) 
Mean cost of the EDL bill 25$ ie about 10% of the 
income 
72 $ ie about 3,4% of the 
income 
Mean cost of the generator’s 14 $ 25 $ 
                                                 
5 These informations come from : Karim Eid-Sabbagh, Amr Saededdine, 2005, “Shatila’s 
services and autonomy”, Report of Phase 2/URPL629, Master of Planning, American 
University of Beirut, 20 p. The authors  
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bill 
Total cost 40 $, 17% of income 100 $, 5% of income 
Source : ICEA-CORAIL-IPSOS Stat 2004 
Contrasted access to fresh water 
The water sector is institutionally more fragmented and it is difficult to get a comprehensive 
picture. First, access to the public water network seems to be less spread than for electricity, 
since only 85% of the households, and 88% of the urban households, have such a connection 
(ICEA-CORAIL-IPSOS 2004). Such low rates are a consequence of the war and the 
development of illegal settlement. But contrarily to EDL, water authorities seem not to have 
encouraged systems similar to izn istihlak for illegal settlements. 
The delivery of water is also non-permanent. Only 49% of urban households get water 
everyday in winter and 29% in summer. The worst situation is for Beirut and the Biqaa. The 
quality is also bad. 52% of inhabitants never drink water from the public network (ICEA-
Corail-IPSOS Stat 2004). Cases of contamination by germs have caused death in Tripoli in 
1998 (Rajab 2006). 
As a consequence, the Lebanese rely on various systems of tanking water to alleviate the 
shortages and they use alternative sources of fresh water for drinking (bottles, municipal 
fountain, private wells…). Here again, the ICEA-CORAIL-IPSOS survey show that the cost 
of these alternative sources of fresh water represent a heavier cost for the more deprived 
households.  
 
The non-permanent and unequal delivery of water and electricity leads to socio-economical 
and geographical differentiations between the Lebanese, and between various neighbourhoods 
of the same cities. They increase previous socio-economic urban inequalities and therefore 
can be considered as a factor of intensified fragmentation at the urban scale. The dramatic 
situation of deprived neighbourhoods has been evidenced in various fieldwork surveys 
(Khayat 2008, Féré 2007 for instance). Conversely, emerging gated communities used the 
quality of service provided by private operators (like developers) as an advertising slogan: 
“What makes Mechref Village truly unique, however, is its complete self-sufficiency as a 
community. A private internal security team ensures your utmost privacy and peace, while the 
internal 24-hour electricity, the well system for water and private roadwork for the internal 
road network mean that all utilities are guaranteed, efficient and rely on the latest 
technologies, in accordance with the highest international standards. (www.mechref.com.lb, 
November 2005).  
Fraud and non-payment as factors of fragmentation 
In response to the shaky delivery of service, fraud and non-payment have developed over the 
war years and have never been eradicated during the reconstruction years. The few indicators 
available reveal regional and geographical gaps, highlighting the informal political 
management of fraud. Data on theft are available only at the national scale, but not at the city 
level. The data show that fraudulent practices reach their maximum in regions far from Beirut 
(Verdeil, 2009).  
Table 4 : Power “theft” (Percentage of non billed consumption and non paid bills on total 
electricity production). Districts according to EDL geographical organization 
Beirut Mount 
Lebanon 
North 
Biqaa 
South 
Mount 
Lebanon 
South 
South 
Lebanon 
North 
Lebanon 
North 
Biqaa 
Middle 
Biqaa 
12,1 % 40,1 % 45,6 % 49,6 % 56 % 60,7 % 67,2 % 69,1 % 
Source : EDL, August 2003, quoted in EL MUFTI, 2005. 
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According to interviews with EDL engineers, some areas like Dahiyeh (the mostly Shia 
populated southern Beirut suburbs) are also subject to strong level of fraud but mostly by 
small customers, whereas in Beirut and in the northern suburbs, fraud has been evidenced for 
big costumers like industries, shops or leisure centres, as well as for personalities. These 
engineers tend to minimize the social and confessional dimension of fraud: the poor and the 
Shias would not necessarily be the biggest cheating population, contrary to widely circulated 
assumptions.  
The fact is corroborated by data on bill payment. Here again, the non-payment is very high in 
rural and mountainous areas, while Mount Lebanon reaches a relatively low level (but of 
course, these regions concentrate the bigger part of the customers). In the suburbs, the 
collection rate has fairly improved over the recent years (see below). In the water sector, the 
fraud rate is not known but the non-payment also reaches a high level: payment at the 
collector’s first visit amounts to 80% in Beirut in 2001; 67% in Mount Lebanon; 60% in 
North Lebanon (ICEA-Corail-IPSOS Stat 2004). 
The geography of theft and non-payment seems very closely linked with the de facto local 
powers which are prevailing in the post-Taif Lebanon. Even if the situation has improved over 
the reconstruction years, the relationships of patronage are preventing in most remote areas 
that sanctions are taken against cheating persons or non-payers (see Verdeil 2009 for a closer 
examination of data). 
Unequal access to services, fragmented city 
The access to urban services not only reflects but also emphasizes the fragmentation of the 
Lebanese cities. At a first level, the legal status of the access to urban services creates several 
categories of citizens (non connected, long-time “temporary” connected or fully connected). 
This is reflecting the different legal and social status of urban dwellers, but it also 
symbolically means a diminished right to the city. The concentration of temporary and non-
connected in Dahiyeh (mainly Raml, Ouzai, Jnah) is labelling them as outlaw places. 
Such a stigma usually isn’t related to these different categories but rather to the prevailing 
practices of fraud and non-payment they are considered to be the paramount of. For sure, such 
practices are to be found in such places but these neighbourhoods don’t hold the monopoly of 
them. Some rural areas but also some wealthier urban neighbourhoods fall in the same 
category. 
The timetable of services supply show great contrasts between the cities and between their 
neighbourhoods, while water and electricity don’t have the same organization. The electricity 
distribution clearly favours the capital city. For water, the decentralised management makes 
the comparison of performances impossible, or at least, it is not linked to a single decision-
making.  
The financial burden weighting on the citizens in order to alleviate the non reliability in time 
and in quality of the urban services is not the same for all. Apart from the geographical 
contrast between Beirut and its suburbs, the main line of splitting is passing between the rich 
and the others categories. Compared to their overall income, rich people pay less for 
alternative sources of provision. They can also develop strategies in order to secure their 
supply: the growth of gated communities is clearly fostered by the provision of autonomously 
produced services. The urban segregation at the scale of the city is sustained by the bad 
performance of state run utilities. 
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The private management of public 
infrastructures: failed attempts and 
fragmented Lebanese governance 
The purpose of the second part is to analyse the reforms of water and electricity sectors and 
the first steps of their implementation. Those reforms seek to introduce, among other patterns, 
public private partnerships. We will emphasize the spatial differentiations such new kinds of 
management have introduced, in terms of relationships between the users, the utilities and the 
local powers. 
Privatisation as a solution for a failed public management? 
The continuous poor performance of the Lebanese utilities in service delivery is a matter of 
public debate since the early 1990’s. But the issue surfaced at the top of the agenda in the late 
1990’s when the problem of the public debt forced the successive governments to tackle it. 
Indeed the debts of the various electricity and water utilities have frantically risen. In 2001, 
the debts of all the water utilities amounted 7% of the public debt (ICEA-CORAIL-IPSOS 
2004). The accumulated debt of EDL during 1993-2006 amounts 11,6 billions US$ (including 
the interests generated) (Ministry of Finance, 2008). In 2008, the Lebanese public debt 
amounts 42 billions US$. We can conclude that the various utilities represent about one third 
of it. Regarding the electricity, the main reason of the rising debt is the surge of the oil price, 
while the tariff was not adjusted, but many other flaws in the management also come in line: 
delay in substituting the old oil processed plants by new gas units, corruption in the 
subcontracting works, technical losses, fraud and non-payment, etc. The water sector also 
suffers from a lack of investment, mismanagement, low collection rates, heavy losses, etc. 
All this led the Hariri government to set up a program for privatization: a new law for the 
reform of the water sector was approved in 2000. It melted the 21 old districts’s water 
agencies in four agencies at the scale of the muhafazat, and allowed them to hire private firms 
to operate (Ghiotti, Barakat 2006). As for the electricity sector, another law in 2002 planned 
the privatisation of the sector. Later steps in the reform process6 foresaw that the utility should 
be unbundled in three units for the generation, the transportation and the distribution 
subsectors. Generation and distribution are to be sold to or operated by the private sector.  
These legal and industrial evolutions have been strongly praised by international financial 
bodies, like the IMF or the World Bank, who helped drafting the new laws, as well as by 
national aid institutions like the French AFD or the USAid. The financial aid given to the 
Lebanese government at the Paris II (2002) and Paris III (2007) conferences was conditioned 
to the implementation of such reforms. Those various good faeries sometimes had 
contradictory points of view, reflecting the interests of their national firms which they backed 
in order to obtain them the access to the Lebanese markets. The French advocated their model 
of delegated management to private firms, which the Lebanese law on privatisation did not 
made possible. Therefore, instead of a delegation of service, it has been necessary to use a 
management contract in Tripoli, which allows less flexibility for the private firm. The reforms 
were also discussed and contested by various Lebanese stakeholders, and all had not the same 
objectives. Their interactions resulted in altering the water reform process (Féré 2007). 
                                                 
6 Every minister drafted his plan: Sehnaoui (2004), Fneish (2006), Tabourian (2009). We can not examine in 
details their analogies and differences but let’s say that the option of introducing PPP remains a central item. 
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Compared to the transformations experienced in other similar countries, one can wonder why 
the discourse of privatisation as a solution for these sectors had not been advocated 
previously. Indeed, several other sectors had experienced PPP in the 1990’s, like the garbage 
collection and treatment, awarded to Sukleen in 1994, the mobile phone awarded to Cellis and 
Libancell, or Liban Post. Not to mention other private sector operations in the real estate 
sector (Solidere, Joseph Khoury, etc…). One of the reasons probably is that water and 
electricity were felt being more sovereign and strategic sector, where public investment had to 
be implemented first in order to reform them before privatizing them. Another reason is the 
resistance of some of the political elites to that privatisation process, at least until a certain 
stage. In the recent years, Hezbollah – in the person of Mohamed Fneish, Minister of Energy 
and Hydraulic Affairs- didn’t oppose the principle of the privatisation of parts of the 
electricity sector but still remains wary (Verdeil 2009). Indeed, those previous experiments 
have, in most cases, illustrated the tendency of the post-Taif Lebanese State to allot shares and 
markets under impenetrable conditions and according to political cronyism (Leenders 2004). 
The fact is that the process of privatisation of those two sectors is only at its beginning. 
Therefore it is impossible to draw give a clear picture of it. But still, it can be read as 
revealing a very fragmented urban governance. 
Privatisation in act : the case of ONDEO-Liban in Tripoli 
In Tripoli, ONDEO-Liban, a subsidiary of the world firm Suez, was awarded a 4 years 
management contract and had to implement the rehabilitation and modernisation of the water 
network, thanks to a 20 M US$ loan by the French Development Agency (AFD). The project 
started in 2003 and was extended for one more year until beginning 2008.  
At the end of the contract, the result, according to various sources, is contrasted and 
disappointing7. If the modernisation of infrastructure has been implemented (new water plant, 
extension of the pipes) and if the service has been improved in terms of water quality and of 
supply regularity, the commercial performance seems to remain weak (the rate of collection 
has not improved as expected) and all the more, the census of the customers and of the linking 
up, a much needed tool in order to eradicate fraud, has not been completed8. Another duty of 
the consultant was to set up the cost accounting, including the census of the water office 
assets. It was also missing. As a consequence, ONDEO-Liban has been sanctioned by a 
financial surcharge of 300.000 euros instead of receiving a bonus of 600.000 euros as was 
expected. 
The operation of the contract has exacerbated tensions between the public client (the water 
office of Tripoli, later integrated in the water authority of the North) and the corporate 
management (for a detailed account, see YOUSFI 2006). The managers of ONDEO-Liban  
have complained about the tight public regulations they had to abide to, which they claimed 
have prevented them from implementing the contract properly. Conversely, the public client 
complained about not having been correctly informed of the operations, sometimes as 
important as the move to new offices. And they also regretted that ONDEO-Liban has 
subcontracted most of the operations to Lebanese firms, whose work was under the standards 
expected from an international company. They claimed, with some grounds, that ONDEO-
Liban was seeking fast profit rather than to really implement all the contract’s objectives. But 
the client, which was badly advised by the independent supervisor, also failed in stating in due 
time the flaws in the operations. Their reluctant attitude toward ONDEO-Liban reflected also 
                                                 
7 See comments by C. Raymond, H. Yousfi and B. Dewailly quoted in Blanc Aymeric, Hibou Béatrice, Compte 
rendu résumé de la Journée d’étude. Renouveler l’analyse des Partenariats Public Privé : Approche par la 
sociologie. Liban, Mali, Maroc. 31 january 2007, AFD, 8 p. www.afd.fr/XXX 
8 According to interviews with AFD officers, Paris, 14 th December 2007. 
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their professional opposition and their self representation as civil servants operating for the 
public good. 
The motive for heading towards a private management was, among other reasons, to 
circumvent the practices of wasta (string-pulling) and of redistribution of services 
traditionally associated with the delivery of public service in Lebanese cities. Several conflicts 
showed the local resistance that ONDEO-Liban had to face during the implementation of the 
project. The hiring of new staff, at the very beginning of the operation, was a first occasion of 
clash (Yousfi 2006). Since employment in the water office was a resource of patronage, the 
Tripoli water office director, linked to the Tripolitan zua’ama, opposed strong resistance 
because he hadn’t been associated with the hiring. 
Another conflict aroused with the new employees who claimed the same advantages than the 
contractual employees previously hired by the Tripoli water office. The stake of the conflict 
was the fear that the private management would result in a less protected status (Yousfi 2006).  
Another problem was the end of the water rights held by some categories of Tripoli 
inhabitants and by local institutions. Historically, some families and institutions owned shares 
of the main source of water that supplied the city. The reform of the water sector has 
suppressed these inherited rights (Rajab 2006). The Tripoli project was not directly the cause 
of the change but ONDEO-Liban had to collect the bills from the ancient right-holders. This 
was angrily contested by the Great Mosque in the ancient city, which used to supply water to 
its neighbourhood for free. The imam called water a gift of God and refused to pay9.  
All these conflicts illustrated the resistance of the local society to the changes the private 
management was introducing or was associated with. They highlighted that water delivery 
and water management are a main source of power in the city. The privatisation process is 
threatening it. Notwithstanding, several compromises were reached and things are moving 
forwards. 
Despites the improvements stated in Tripoli, ONDEO-Liban has decided to step down, 
claiming the difficulty it faced while operating in Lebanon, at a critical time of political 
instability, and complaining about the difficult relationships with a bureaucratic 
administration. Such a decision is also in line with the global strategy of the firm, which has 
ended several other contracts since 2002 (the most famous of them is Buenos Aires), because 
of the low profitability of operation in poor countries.  
Whatever the responsibility in the Tripoli case, the fact is worrying. Indeed, the experience 
was expected to be extended to all the Northern province, assuming that the operation at the 
scale of the city would be highly profitable and that a balancing out with less attractive rural 
or mountainous regions could be implemented. One can fear that few foreign investors will be 
interested in investing in Lebanon, as the international community had planned. The issue of 
the modernisation of the water sector remains without any easy solution, particularly for poor 
areas. The relative improvement in Tripoli will not benefit to nearby poorer places, thus 
aggravating the prevailing spatial inequalities. 
Subcontracting the power distribution: uncovering the peculiarities 
of local regulations 
The process of privatising the power sector only stands at its very beginning. The Saniura 
government commissioned several auditing firms and consultants in order to lay down the 
way to the corporatisation of the utility, which implies a cost accounting and the census of its 
assets. Then, it’s planned to unbundle it into several functional units (generation, 
transportation and distribution), of which the first and the last would be sold or whose 
operation would be managed by private firms. Before reaching this stage, it is possible for a 
                                                 
9 According to interviews with AFD officers, Paris, 14 th December 2007. 
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management contract to be established in order to upgrade the utility’s results. Some critical 
reforms must be carried out, like the setting up of a new tariff reflecting the rise in the 
generation cost resulting from the oil price surge. The tariff has not been updated since 1994. 
In 2007, the Lebanese government has awarded two projects of power generation plants but 
they seem to be shelved. No project has been drafted for the distribution sector yet, though 
PPP are frequently said to be the solution10. Nevertheless, between 2002 and 2005, an 
interesting experience took place, whose results I will analyse now. The government assigned 
private firms the task of reading the meters, of distributing the bills and collecting the fees, as 
well as of detecting the fraud and fixing it. In Beirut suburbs (da’ira of Antelias and Chiyah), 
the French firm EDF was commissioned. For the other da’ira-s throughout the country, local 
firms were selected after a tender. Most of the selected ones were without experience in the 
field and, as I was told, in many cases their owners were known for their closeness to the local 
zu’ama-s. The experience stopped in July 2005 when the contract of EDF was ended without 
explanations, probably because of the change in the balance of power after the legislative 
elections and the arrival of a new minister. Later on, the contracts of the private local firms in 
the da’iras were also interrupted or not renewed. 
This limited experience of subcontracting private firms reading the meters and fighting the 
fraud resulted in strongly contrasted results. At one end, EDF scored very impressive results 
in its period of operation. The amount of billed electricity rose (+50%), the rate of non-
payment fell down at less than 4%, EDF made a hike in detected fraud (more than 100.000 
thefts detected and fined in 2002-2003)11. These achievements were obtained through 
‘commando methods’, according to one manager: it means an intensive monitoring on the 
field, bimonthly fraud eradication operations, etc. The EDF teams faced strong opposition 
from fraudulent electricity users, sometimes turning to local riots (March 2004 in Jnah). 
According to the manager, the operations were successfully implemented with the help of the 
Interior Security Forces (ISF) and when necessary, thanks to coordination with those labelled 
“villages chiefs” by the manager. In Dahiyeh, he also mentioned close cooperation with 
Hezbollah. EDF targeted not only ‘small fry’ but also personalities, major enterprises, in the 
southern suburbs as well as in the northern suburbs. Their methods and results were so 
successful that EDL authorities invited EDF teams for one-day commando operations in 
Saida, Jounieh and Tripoli. The EDF enrolment was dedicated to impulse new methods and a 
new spirit to the employees of EDL regarding the distribution. The contract apparently didn’t 
provide for a link between EDF’s income and its results. It is possible that EDF was seeking 
to be granted a broader contract on the Lebanese market but its presence was part of a wider 
strategic help and technical program for the rehabilitation of EDL. In 2005, the collaboration 
in the distribution ended, probably because EDF worked on the field with associated firms 
that were linked to Syrian interests. 
In most Lebanese provinces, the private local firms in charge of reading the meter and 
collecting the fees didn’t reach the same results. No figures were available from EDL, one 
reason being that EDL experienced many difficulties in monitoring the results these private 
firms achieved. According to non official sources embedded in the operations in the North 
and in the Biqaa, the results have been very disappointing both in terms of fees collecting and 
of fraud detection12. Among the many reasons of the deceiving operation, we can name the 
lack of professionalism of those firms, the flaws in the mechanism of linking their earnings 
                                                 
10 For instance, Le Commerce du Levant, septembre 2008 ; or Dana Halawi , 'Diversity key to managing fuel 
price swings', The Daily Star, March 26, 2009 
11 S. Risk, « Énergie - Une récapitulation de ce qui ne tourne pas rond depuis des années. 
L’électricité, un secteur gangrené de toutes parts », L’Orient-Le Jour, 28/12/2004. 
12 A sounder analyse in available in Verdeil 2009. 
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with their results, the protection that the cheating or non-paying customers enjoyed from their 
zu’ama, as well as the lack of coordination with the ISF. 
The experience of subcontracted private firms in order to read the meters, to collect the fees 
and to fight the theft delivers no black or white results. It shows that the private sector isn’t in 
itself the criterion of a successful reform: it depends very much on the political regulations on 
the field and the keenness of local forces to comply with the enforcement of new practices. In 
the period until 2006, it seems that Hezbollah favoured reform even at the expense of most of 
its clientele in Dahiyeh. Conversely, in other areas (Biqaa, North Lebanon, South), local 
forces have been reluctant to the reform of the distribution sector. Therefore, we can conclude 
that those experiments have aggravated the territorial fragmentation, since the implementation 
of that new management methods results being particularly felt by the inhabitants of the 
Greater Beirut. In that area, the better fees collections and the reducing of theft has led to an 
increase in spending, relatively more difficult to bear for the poorest households. 
The recent wars and the politics of 
infrastructure 
The political violence of the three last years has had strong impacts on the electricity and 
fresh water infrastructure, thus affecting the performance of the utilities. The aggravation of 
the already tensed conditions of supply makes it compulsory for the households to rely on 
alternative means of provision. But once again, the geographically and socially differentiated 
weight of these alternatives can be read as a new factor of fragmentation. 
Infrastructures as targets 
Stephen Graham has theorised, in an analysis based on the American policy vis à vis Iraq, 
“the changing nature of war” and the targeting of “the vulnerabilities of urban metabolism” in 
order to “forced demodernization”. He stresses that “war and geopolitical struggle are 
increasingly being fought through the infrastructures of everydaylife” (Graham, 2005, pp.246-
248).  
The case of Lebanon sustains such a view. The war of summer 2006 provides a first account. 
The Israeli chief commander openly pledged to take Lebanon twenty years backwards. Under 
the pretense of cutting all communication lines for Hezbollah, the Lebanese infrastructure in 
has been systematically targeted and hugely damaged. The power and water sectors have been 
prime targets during the Israeli war of the summer 2006, at least in the South of the country. 
The IDF have bombed the power plant of Jiyeh and several poles and substations in the south. 
In the same time, they also targeted various water stations and pipes. As a result, most 
southern cities and villages remained without power and water for long weeks. The cost of the 
damages inflicted to water and electricity infrastructures has been estimated to 193 M$13. 
Syria then offered to increase its power delivery in a sign of solidarity with the Lebanese 
people. Given the tensed relationships between the two countries after 2005, this gesture 
highlights the geopolitical nature of electricity. 
Another interesting example shows that internal conflicts also might take infrastructures as 
targets. At the summer 2007, during the siege of Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al Bared camp by 
the Lebanese Army, the Islamist fighters targeted successfully the Deir al Ammar power 
plant, thus reducing again the generation potential of EDL. In both cases, the attacks against 
the water and power networks were not directed against the cities or specific places, but 
                                                 
13 www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb (21/12/2006). 
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targeted the country as a whole integrated and interconnected network. In the villages and 
small towns of the South, the addition of the damages to the various networks combined with 
the overall destructions led to a long-lasting paralysis. 
The socio-territorial impacts of the infrastructure targeting  
Graham’s analysis stresses that the US strategy regarding networks was intended to weaken 
“to disable Iraq’s war machine and influence civilian morale”, while it “led, indirectly, to 
mass civilian casualties, as Iraqi urban civil society was ruthlessly demodernized” (Graham, 
2006, p.253). The magnitude of the damages resulting from the 2006 summer war in 
Lebanon, and from the siege of Nahr al Bared cannot be compared with Iraq. But they have 
had long-lasting and systemic effects. They thus offer an opportunity to develop Graham 
argument, in showing how such damages to the networks emphasize and increase the 
fragmentation process already at work in the Lebanese society. The case of electricity is 
particularly demonstrative14. 
Since the 2006 summer war, the damage of the electricity grid and the diminished capacity of 
power production have led to an increase of the shortage at the national scale. It must be said 
that at the same time, the surge of oil prices has aggravated the financial situation of EDL and 
limited its capacity to intervene. But once again, the spatial distribution of the shortage was 
not homogeneous and some places suffered more than others. Data provided at the beginning 
of the year 2008 (table 2) show the deepening of the situation regarding power distribution 
between the regions and the capital city. What’s more, this was happening while the surge in 
oil price made the supply of electricity from generators far more expensive, and in the context 
of increasing prices and deep economic crisis. We have previously shown that the burden 
incurred because of the recourse to generators is proportionally heavier for poorer people. So, 
the consequences of the power infrastructure crisis accentuate the already existing 
fragmentation process. 
This is palpable through the emergence several social movements that can be analysed as a 
reaction to that crisis. During December 2007-January 2008, several demonstrations against 
the electricity crisis took on the street. They eventually degenerated on the 28th of January in a 
bloody riot in Chiyah, which left several dead casualties. This must certainly be interpreted as 
a step in the mounting tensions in the fight between the Hezbollah-led opposition and the 
Saniura government, which peaked in the May events. Without contesting the political 
signification of the movement and its political uses, its social roots must be clearly 
understood. Indeed, the people of Dahiyeh have not only suffered a very strong rationing of 
the electricity delivery (like do all the Lebanese outside Beirut). They have also paid the 
higher price of the implementation of the reform of the electricity distribution. The riots of 
end 2007-2008 in Dahiyeh can therefore also be understood as a paradoxical result of the 
failed reform of theft repression and billing examined above. After the end of those contracts 
in 2005 and after the 2006 war, all reports mention lower collection rates and rising frauds 
practices, in relationships with the splitting politics on the fields, and probably, with the 
deteriorating economic situation15. The inhabitants of Dahiyeh are among the ones who have 
paid the higher price during EDF intervention; today, they have to bear, like all the Lebanese, 
the continued interrupted delivery of electricity, and have to consume more diesel for the 
generators at a time when the price of diesel has frantically grown. 
Conclusion 
                                                 
14 We believe our hypothesis could also be verified in the Iraqi case (see Verdeil 2008). 
15 See for instance : The Daily Star, 30 June 2007. 
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Understanding, beyond its technical dimension, the social and political stakes of the 
management of urban infrastructure is an interesting avenue into urban research in Lebanon. 
The multiples failures in the urban services delivery in the Lebanese cities make their 
investigation a critical field in order to depict the social, political and sectarian fragmentation 
at work.  
During the reconstruction years, (urban) infrastructure has enjoyed huge investments. But 
little attention has been given to the management of the service supply, which remained 
hostage of the zu’ama controlled redistribution of services and therefore contributed to the 
enormous increase of the public debt, while the performance remained questionable. The 
invisible flows of water or electricity are critical components of the daily life and their 
delivery is the result of complex technical social and political negotiations, including 
negotiations of space, between political forces at the national and the local level, the 
inhabitants and public or private (sometimes informal) operators.  
The recent attempts to reform theses sectors have experienced huge difficulties and proven 
deceiving. With reference to Graham and Marvin’s thesis, one has to acknowledge the fact 
that the design and implementation of public private partnerships has, until now, remained 
very limited. Turning to privatization hasn’t been a decisive step and has engendered 
mitigated results. The reform of urban service does not only depend upon the impulses for 
reform that are sent from the top (government and international institutions). Given the 
particular nature of the political field, and its fragmentation, the implementation of reforms is 
highly dependent upon the involvement of locally rooted social and political forces. These 
experiments have complexified the patterns of governance but, though trends of accentuated 
fragmentation can be stated, we cannot generalize and maintain that the neoliberal reforms of 
the water and electricity sectors have increased the social and spatial fragmentation in the 
country. 
The recent wars and the targeting of infrastructure have produced long-lasting effects that 
have grown over a messy situation. The damages have nurtured and increased social, 
geographical and sectarian tensions already at work. The politics of infrastructure or of the 
“urban metabolism” prove highly sensitive for the equilibrium of the Lebanese society. There 
are of course technical decisions that have to be well weighted in order to improve the 
production of power, and to extend and upgrade the networks of water and electricity in order 
to make the delivery more efficient, thus allowing the customers to cut the cost of alternative 
supply. It is also needed to recover the cost incurred through adequate and socially fine-tuned 
rises in tariff. The challenge is to achieve these objectives without aggravating the 
fragmentation process. Therefore the political dimension of such decision has to be clearly 
acknowledged. It is time to find a way towards social and spatial justice. 
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